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Summary findings
Policymakers  typically  assume that trade liberalization  labor and improve  workers' ability  to cover the costs of
and foreign  aid ultimately  reduce international  migration  migration.  As a result, migration  will increase.
- that is, that trade and aid are substitutes  for  (Following  trade liberalization,  female  migrants  have
migration.  In the Heckscher-Ohlin  framework,  too, trade  increasingly  been employed in the textile,  garment, light
liberalization  (by  reducing international  price  electronics,  and agricultural  processing  industries  in Asia,
differentials  between factors)  leads  to a declinc  in  Latin America,  and North Africa, for example, and their
international migration.  higher income  has helped finance  the migration  of men.)
Schiff's  model shows  that trade liberalization  in either  What about the combined effect of trade liberalization
the sending  or the receiving  country is likely  to increase  and foreign aid, a frequent combination  associated  with
migrat.on  in the long run. In the short run, the effect is  bilateral  and multilateral  aid? The lower the labor
ambiguous.  income and the higher the costs of migration,  the more
Schiff  maintains  the Heckscher-Ohlin  framework  but  likely  trade liberalization,  foreign  aid, and remittances
adds two features found in developing  economies of the  are to complement  each other and lead to increased
south and east that affect migration:  migration  costs  and  migration.  (This is particularly  applicable  for south-north
imperfect  capital markers.  and east-west  migration,  as incomes  in the sending
He assumes  that migration  costs may be a constraint  countries are often low relative to migration  costs.)
on migration, especially  when combined  with imperfect  If trade liberalization  in either country is too weak to
capital markets. Poor migrants  without collateral may  positively  affect  migration,  adding either foreign aid or
have trouble getting loans at reasonable  rates, especially  remittances  is likely  to increase  migration.
if they plan to emigrate. And for most migrants,  the cost  If trade liberalization  is significant  enough to increase
of migration  is not negligible.  They must pay for  migration,  adding foreign aid is likely  to dampen  that
transportation antd  for living  expenses  until they find a  effect,  and remittances  will have no effecL
job in the new country, and illegal  immigrants  must  Migration is also  affected by geography,  by migration
make  payments to intermediaries  for services  and  laws (in either sending or receiving  countries),  and by
information (to reduce the chance of being caught).  transport technology.
Trade liberalization  in a labor-abundant  economy,  Future work will deal with the welfare  consequences
foreign  aid, and remittances  will increase income from  of migration,  including  losses  in social capitaL
This  paper  - a product  of the International  Trade  Division,  International  Economics  Deparunent-  is part of a larger  effort in
the department  to examine  the determinants  and  effects  of international  migration.  The study  was  funded  by  the Bank's  Research
Support  Budget  under  tie research  project  'International  Migration,  Trade  Policy,  and Capital  Flows"  (RPO  679-05).  Copies  of
the  paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please  conact Jennifer Ngaine,
room R2-052, extension 37947 (20 pages).  November 1994.
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The issue of trade policy and international  migration has figured prominently in recent
debates on regional trade agreements such as NAFTA and the Association  Agreements  between
the EU on the one hand and Eastem  Eumpean  and Magbreb countries on the other  hand.  It has
also figured in the debate in the EU in relation to the potentially  massive emigration from the
fonner Soviet Union (FSU) and in the context of Algeria's rising political instability. Foreign
aid has also been considered in this context.  Much of the debate has been based on  the
assumption that trade liberalization  and foreign  aid lead  to a reduction  in inational  migration.'
Similarly, in the Heckscher-Ohlin  interational trade model where comparative  advantage
is based on relative factor abundance,  trade lberalization leads to a fall in interational  migration
by  reducing international factor price differentals.  In that sense, trade and migration are
assumed to be substitutes. 2
There is some evidence in the migration literature suggesting that migraion  and trade
t For  instance, Germany's foreign ministr  Klaus Kinkel recently declared that - in the
context of the concern with emigration from the FSU - opening the West European markets to
goods from the East  was the highest priority of a  new inidatve  on  a  common European
"ostpolitikl (Financial Times  March 24, 1994). Similarly, President Salinas of Mexico has
stated in relaton  to NAFTA that Mexico wants to  export more goods, not people.
2  The seminal paper which derives the substibility  result is Mundell (1957).  A recent
paper which makes the  same argument is Faini and Venurini  (1993).  They state that "By
pursuing more hlberal trade policies, industiad  counties  may contrbute  to  significantly
reduce migration  pressures".may in fact be complements rather than substitutes, i.e.,  that trade liberalization  may lead to an
increase in both migration and trade, at least in the short run (US Commission for the Study of
International  Migration 1990, Russell and Teitelbaum 1992, Martin 1993). Martin suggests that
economic development and regional integration such as  NAFTA may generate a migration
"hump", with  migration first rising and  then falling.  Though the ideas presented in  that
literature may have a lot of merit, no rigorous framework is presented. .
Complementarity  between migration and trade has not only been argued in the migration
literature but is found in the trade literature as well.  For instance, Markusen (1983) argues that
if the basis for trade is something other than a difference in relative factor endowments - such
as a difference in technology  or economies  of scale - then migration and trade are complements.
Economies of scale are important for North-North intra-industry trade where taste for variety
determines much of the trade flows.  They are of much lesser importance  for North-South trade.
And  though  technological differences play  an  important role  m  North-South  trade,  the
complementarity result Markusen  obtains is  specific to  the  way  he models  technological
differences. 4
This paper matains  the factor pmportion framework but adds some features found in
3  Sjaastad (1962), in a seminal paper, applies investment  theory to the decision to migrate.
He does not examine the impact of trade policy since his paper deals only with domestic
migration.
4 Markusen assumes that technology is higher in one country but only in one sector.  More
realistically, assume that the higher technology were embedded  in one factor, say capital, which
would be more productive in both sectors in the North (with both better agriculnual and better
industrial machinery).  h  that case, technological differences would result in  substitutability
between migration and trade.
2economies of  the  South (and  East).  These  include migration costs  and  capital  market
imperfecdons.  Adding these features to  the Heckscher-Ohlin model is  likely to  generate
complementarity  between trade, foreign aid and remitances on the one hand, and migration on
the other hand.  The migration effect of  foreign aid is shown to  differ from the effect of
remittances. The model with intersectoral factor mobility  is developed  in Section II.  In Section
III, I develop the model for the (short-run) case where capital is sector-specific.  Section IV
presents preliminary evidence and Section V concludes.
II. The Model with Factor Mobility
The trade literture  has examined  the impact of trade policy on the reward from investing
in migration.  In other words, that literature has focused on the impact of trade policy on the
nternational wage differential.  We also focus on the imvestment  cost.  Assuming non-zero
nigration  costs  may reverse the  impact of  trade policy on migration if  coupled with  the
assumption of imperfect capital markets.
The assumption of migration costs and imperfect capital markets as a  constraint to
migration is valid for a large nmber  of developing  countries.  Starting with the capital market,
most people in poor developing  countries  have limtle  or no collateral  and therefore cannot borrow
at competitive rates on the capital market.  In order to obtain a loan, they may have to pay
prohibitive rates and these may result in a negative  net present value for the potential investment
which the loan was to finance.  If that is the case, the investment will not be undertaken.  This
applies especially  to international  migration since the risk of default is even larger in that case.
3Migration costs have several components, some of which are emotional 5  and others
financial.  The financial costs include the transport cost, the living expenses in the destination
country until a job is found, and the additional  cost for illegal migrants such as the investment
in  information to  reduce  the  chance  of  being  caught and  the  payments to  the  various
intermediaries who provide illegal migration services.  If a large proportion of unskilled labor
migrates illegally, then the low-income  migrants  will experience  high migration  costs. And they
may be unable to finance their migration costs out of their low wage income.
a. Trade  Liberalization.
Assume two economies  with two factors, iabor and capital, producing (and consuming)
two goods. 6  The economy in the North, denoted by N, is a large developed  economy such as
the European Union (EU) or the U.S.  The economy in the South, denoted by S, is a small
developing economy whose migrants typically  move to the U.S. - such as Mexico and Central
American or Caribbean countries - or whose migrants  typically move to the EU - such as
Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Poland or Cote d'Ivoire.
Assume that N is relatively capital abundant and S is relatively labor abundant.  We
assume that country S trades exclusively with N.  Given that S is small, it takes prices in N as
given.  Prices in N and trade policy in S determine domestic output prices and factor prices in
5 On the emotional cost due to the loss in social capital, see the concluding comments  at the
end of Section V.
6 A more elaborate model, with two labor skills (skilled and unskilled) and with variable
migration costs, or alternatively with a continuum of labor skills, is provided in Lopez and
Schiff (1994).
4S.  S exports its labor-intensive good. 7  And it is assumed to  protect its capital-intensive
import-substituting  sector M.  This lowers the wage-rental ratio in S below that in N, with a
lower wage rate and a higher rental rate in S than in N.  The wage differential provides the
incentive to migrate from S to N.
Reducing  protection of the import-substituting  sector in S raises its wage-rental ratio and
reduces the wage gap between N and S.  8  Abstracting from the ability to pay for migration
costs, this should lead to a reduction in migration.
However, assume that in S,
(1)  Wp  c Wo  <  Wp +  C,
where Wo is the initial wage rate, Wp is the subsistence  wage, and C is the constant unit
cost of migrating from S to N.  Assume also that there is no resource accumulation through
domestic saving (all goods are perishable)  or through foreign saving (trade is balanced).  Thus,
migration costs C must be paid out of current income.  At Wo, individuals can pay for their
subsistence costs Wp but not for their migration costs C as well.  Hence, they consume their
7 In the case of Morocco, Faini and de Melo (1994) have found that for a given industrial
sector value added. sectoral employment increases as the  share of  exports in value added
increases, confming  the higher labor-intensity  of exorts.
Of course, if there is unemployment  in the South, say because of a minimum wage law,
then trade liberalization will lower unemployment  and will not necessarily result in a higher
wage rate.
Sentire income Wo (larger  han Wp).9
The new wage rate following  partial trade liberalization  is W'  >  Wo. 10 Denoting the
wage rate in the North by Wn, one of the following  inequalities must hold:
(2a)  Wo <  W'  Wp +  C  =>  no migration,
(2b)  Wp +  C  <  W'  <  Wn - C  = >  migration from S to N,
(2c)  Wp  +  C  <  Wn-C  <  W'  = >  no migration.
For simplicity, the time dimension has not been explicitly included.  In fact, though,
decisions are made sequentially.  Workers in the South first check whether they can pay for
migration.  If they can not (i.e., if inequalities  (2a) hold), then they consume W'  and do not
migrate.  If  they can pay for migration (first inequality of  (2b)), they then have to decide
whether it is worthwhile to migrate.  In the South, they earn W'.  In the North, they will earn
Wn >  W'.  However, to obtain the wage difference Wn - W', they must invest C in migration
costs.  Thus, they will migrate if and only if C  <  Wn - W',  or equivalently if W'  <  Wn - C
(second inequality of (2b)).  If Wn - W'  <  C,  or equivalently if Wn - C  <  W'  (inequality
(2c)), they will choose not to migrate even though they can pay for the migration costs. "
9 We implicitly  assume that there are capitalists  who own the entire capital stock K and who
consume their entire income from capital rK, where r is the rental rate per unit of K.  Then,
trade is balanced.
I  The real wage also increases since Pm, the price of importables, falls and Px, the price
of exportables, remains unchanged.
"1  The  model presented here  is  a one-period model.  It  is clear that migration is  an
investment (Sjaastad 1962) whose returns are obtained  over a mnmber  of periods. Thus, Ws and
Wn are flows while C is a stock.  A one-period version rather than a dynamic version of the
6Thus, migration will only take place if (2b) holds.  When will migration stop?  With
reduced protection in S and intersectoral  factor mobility, the capital-intensive  import-substituting
sector M contracts and the labor-intensive  export sector X expands.  The opposite occurs as
labor migrates from S to N.  With a reduction in labor supply, X contracts and M expands
(Rybczynski Theorem).  This has no effect on factor returns as long as both X and M are
produced and X (M) remains the exportable (importable). However, since both X and M are
consumed in the  South, and since sector X shrinks and sector M expands as more people
migrate, at some point the excess-supply of X falls to zero and the excess-demand  for M falls
to zero as well (since trade is balanced). At that point, X is about to become the inportable and
M the exportable.  However, with M becoming  the exportable at that point, the tariff on M loses
its effect, the economy is in a free trade situation and factor prices are equalized.  Hence,
migration stops at the point where the direction of trade is being reversed.  Tbus, e.-en though
the trade barriers are not effective (i.e., we have free nade), neither trade nor migration takes
place in equilibrium.  The new wage in the South is W",  where
(3)  W"  =  Wn.
Thus, in this model, if partial trade liberalization  raises the wage rate sufficiently to pay
for migration costs but not to the point where migration becomes  unattractive, it will lead to a
temporary increase in migration.  This results in a permanent increase in the stock of migrants
model is chosen here because of its simplicity and because it brings out the central point on the
effect of migration costs and imperfect capital markets on migration.
7in N and in an equivalent permanent reduction in labor in S.  The same results would obtain
if partial trade liberalization were to take place in the labor-intensive  import-substituting  sector
in the North.  This would lower the domestic producer price in that sector in the North and
lower Wn, say to W'n.  It would also raise the world price in that sector and raise Ws, say to
Wi. 12 Assuming that Wp + C  <  W'  <  W'n  - C,  migration  will take place as well.
Trade liberalization  in the North seems preferable for the South than trade liberalization
in the South because the former results in an improvement in the South's terms of trade (a rise
in the price of its exports).  This is true in terms of GDP.  However, for the migrants, trade
liberalization in the South is preferable because the wage rate in the North does not fall in that
case.  Thus, though GDP in the South is higher with liberalization  in the North, the same need
not be true for GNP.
Interestingly, in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade liberalizationi  leads to a
contraction of M and an expansion  of X.  In this case, the exact opposite occurs because of the
impact on migration.  S now exports M and imports X.
Also, the partial trade liberalization initially reduces the return to capital.  Generally,
when a policy penalizes a sector or factor, the market reacts in order to mitigate the -penalty.
However, in this case, just the opposite takes place.  Rather than mitigating  the initial effect on
capital, the market reaction exacerbates  it.  At first, partial trade liberalization  lowers the return
to capital but the return remains higher than in the North because of the remaining protection
on sector M.  In the long run equilibrium where M is exported and X is imported, the return
The real wage increases in this case as well since W rises proportionately more  an  Px
(magnification  effect) and Pm remains unchanged.
8to capital  falls further  and equals  the level in the North.
b. Foreign Aid
What  about the effect  of foreign  aid? Assuming  the aid goes to labor, it will raise labor
income from Wo  to,  say, W',  and will have the same impact on migration as  trade
liberalization.  1 3 The aid would  be expected  to go to labor if it were given in the forn of food
(such  as the U.S. food  aid program  P.L. 480)  since  such  aid would  be expected  to be distributed
to the poorer segments  of the population.' 4 If the foreign aid is invested  in international
transport  infrastructure  (such  as ports  and airports),  it will lead  to lower  international  transport
costs, resulting  in higher  domestic  prices  for exports  and lower prices  for imports. The effect
is similar to a movement  towards free trade, with higher wage rates and possibly higher
migration.
What  about the effect  of the combination  of trade liberalization  and foreign  aid?  This
question  is most relevant  since  a number  of trade  liberalization  experiments  have  been  supported
by bilateral  and multilateral  aid.  For instance,  Mexico's  and Morocco's  trade reforms were
supported  by IMF Standby  Agreements  and World  Bank  Structural  Adjustment  Loans. And the
process  of market refonn in the FSU has also been supported  by foreign  aid (from  the IMF,
'3  One difference  is that in this case, the increase  in labor income  does not come at the
expense  of capital  income. Second,  imports  are larger fian exports  in this case, with  the trade
deficit  financed  by foreign  aid.  The same  holds  for the case of remittances  below.
14This  has not always  been  the case as the food  has not always  been  distributed  to the poor
but has at times  been sold  in the market.
9World Bank, EBRD, as well as bilateral aid)."
With trade liberalizatioin,  Wo rises to W'.  Denote the foreign aid per worker by F and
denote labor income by YT,  where Y = W'  + F.  Then one of the following inequalities must
hold:
(4a)  W'  <  Y <  Wp +C,
(4b)  Wp+C  <Y<  Wn-C,or
(4c)  Wp+C  < Wn-C  <  Y.
(4d)  Wp + C  <Wn-C  <Wn  +C  <Y.
-f W' is still too low to fmance the migration cost before foreign aid is given (so that the
binding constraint is inequality (2a)), foreign aid can have four possible effects: it will eidter
have no impact because it is small and labor income is still too low to finance the migration  cost
(the constraint is now (4a)), it will result in an increase in migration - the binding constraint
becoming inequality (4b), it will have no impact because labor income is so high that there is
no incentive to migrate (inequality (4c)), or labor income is so high that it results in return
nigration from the north to the South (inequality (4d)).  If W'  is high enough to pay  for
migration costs before foreign aid is given and migration takes place (the binding constraint is
(2b)), then foreign aid can have three possible effects: it will either have no effect (the constraint
is now (4b)), it will result in a decrease in migration (the binding constraint becoming (4c)), or
u5The amount of the loans by the World Bank, the IMF, the EBRD and by bilateral agencies
cannot be entirely considered as aid.  These loans generally entail better conditions than those
offered in the market (lower interest rates, better repayment conditions, etc).  The aid element
in those loans consists of the value of these better conditions.
10it will result in return migration (inequality  (4d)).  Hence, if trade liberalization  by itself has a
positive impact on migration (inequality (2b) holds), then foreign aid is likely to dampen that
positive effect and may even result in return migration. Finally, if W' is that high that migration
is unattractive (inequality (2c) holds), then foreign aid will either have no impact (inequality
(4c)), or if foreign aid is large enough, it will result in return migration (inequality (4d)).
c. Remittances
What about remittances?  Assume that migration is a family decision rather than an
individual one,  with  migration by  one  member of  the  family being part  of  the  family's
intertemporal welfare  maximization process.  I6  Initially,  though,  if  equation  (1)  holds,
migration is not feasible (given the lack of access to formal credit markets). However, informal
credit markets may exist where borrowing is possible.  For instance, if more than one member
of the (extended) family works, with each one erning  Wo  >  Wp, those who do not migrate
may choose to sacrifice some present consumption  (up to a maximum  of Wo-Wp) to finance the
migration of the family member selected to migrate.  The implicit family contract implies that
the migrant who is now earning a higher income  Wn in the North will remit part of the income
to his/her family in the South.  The remitunces raise the income of family members in the
South.
Denote remittances per remaining family member by R and labor income by Y = Wo
+ R.  Then, given equation (1), remittances  will either have no impact (inequality (4a) holds)
On migration as part of a family's decision process, see Stark 1991.
11or will lead to an increase in migration (inequality  (4b), (4c) or (4 )). "  Why does migration
increase when inequalities (4c) or (4d) hold in the case of remittances but not in the case of
foreign aid?
There is a fundamental difference between remittances and foreign aid.  Foreign aid
actually raises family income.  Remittances  on the other hand are a transfer within the family.
Hence, though inequality (4c) in the case of foreign aid implies that there will be no migration
and inequality  (4d) implies that there will be return migration, this does not hold for remittances.
Remittances raise income for the family member in the South and lowers income for the family
member in the North.  Since family welfare is the objective to be maximized, what matters is
the comparison between the wage rate Wo in the South and the wage rate in the North net of
migration  costs Wn - C.  Since Wo  <  Wn - C, the members  of the family  will migrare  even
if inequality (4c) or (4d) holds.
With trade liberalization,  migration  either remains unchanged (inequality (2a) or (2c)) or
increases (inequality (2b)).  If inequality (2a) holds, then remittances will have no  effect on
migration (inequality (4a)) or will raise it (inequalty (4b), (4c) or (4d)). If inequality  (2b) holds
and trade liberalization  has by itself led to an increase in migration, then remittances will have
no impact on migration.  They can not, as in the case of foreign aid, result in lower migration
or return migra'tion.1
17  Remember also that the initial migration would not have occmTed  without the implicit
family contract that the migrant would remit.
18 Of  course, if investment takes place, large remittances may lead family members to
remain in  the South in order to manage the investments (such as building a family house,
running a family business or managing family assets).
12What about the impact of trade liberalization  on remittances? Since trade liberalization
leads to an increase in the wage in the South, the incentive  to remit by migrants, in the context
of family welfare maximization,  falls.  Moreover, trade liberalization  lowers Pm, leading to an
additional increase in real labor income in the South and to a furither  reduction in remittances.  19
111.  The Model with Specific Factors
In the short run, some factors are immobile across sectors.  For  instance, a chemical
plant or a textile machine  cannot be transformed overnight  into a tree or a milk processing plant.
I assume here that capital K is sector-specific in the short run while labor L is mobile across
sectors.  This applies especially  to unskilled labor.  Skilled labor may also be sector-specific  in
the short rmn.
The model here draws on the seminal paper by Mussa (1974).  In his paper,  Mussa
examines the effect of a change in the terms of trade in the short run - under factor specificity -
and in the long run when all factors are fully mobile. -We add international  migration of the
mobile factor L, migration costs and imperfect capital markets.
Assume that the importable sector M is capital-intensive. Protection of M implies a
higher return to capital and a lower return to labor in the home country than in the world (long-
term equilibrhim).  Assume now that trade is liberalzed.  This is shown in Figure 1.  The
"  There is also a substitution  effect.  The lower Pm makes consumption  of M in -the South
relatively more attractive than it was before.  One dollar of remituance  now buys more than
before.  This should lead to an increase in remittances. It would seem plausible to expect the
two real income effects to dominate  the substitution  effect.  If so, trade liberalization  will result
in a reduction in remittances.
13downward-sloping  curves represent the value of the marginal product of labor in the two sectors,
VMPLm and VMPLx.  With liberalization  of M, the domestic  price of M, Pm, falls from Pm(O)
to  Pm(l),  and VMPLm(O)  falls to  VMPLm(l).  Equilibrium is at the lower wage rate Wl
(rather than WO), with more labor employed in X and less in M.
Given that the wage rate Ws falls from Wo to Wl,  what happens to migration?  First,
Pm fails by a larger proportion than Ws.  This can be seen from Figure 1.  Only if VMPLx had
zero  elasticity would dlogPm =  dlogWs.  With positive elasticity of VMPLx,  dlogPm  >
dlogWs.  Consequently, even though Ws falls, it is not clear that the real wage Ws/CPI  =
Ws/[aPm +  (1-a)PxJ falls (where a is the share of M in consumption).  Since the change in
WsICPI is ambiguous, the impact on migration is ambiguous as well.
If  trade liberalization occurs in  the North,  the world price  of X,  which equals the
domestic price  in the South, rises,  raising VMPLx.  The wage rate in the South rises by a
proportion of the increase in Px to a level W2 (see Figure 1).  The CPI may rise by more or
less than W2.  Hence, the impact on migration is ambiguous in this case as well.
What about the impact of foreign aid?  As in the long-run case, as long as the aid goes
to labor, total labor income rises and migration may remain unchanged (equations (4a) or (4c)),
increase (equation (4b)) or it may return (equation (4d)).
What about remittances?  Assmming  some family pooling of incomes to send a family
member North.  As in the long-ran case, the resulting  remittances will either have no impact on
migration because they are small (except for the impact on the original migrant who remits as
part of an implicit family contract) or they will have a positive impact on migration.
14IV. Evidence on Complementarity
From the model presented above, we obtain that the impact of trade liberalization on
migration is ambiguous in  the  short run  and is positive (or zero) in  the  long  run.  The
assumption is that the migration cost C is an important constraint for a  significant share of
potential migrants.
There  is some evidence to  support the fact that the financial cost of  migration is a
constraining factor.  First, a World Bank study on Morocco (Report 11918-MOR, 1994) found
that most migrants do not belong to the group below the poverty line.  The study also found that
"...  workers' remittances benefit relatively non-poor houscholds rather than the poor".  Of
course, the evidence may point to the fact that migration requires a minimum  of skills as well
as fimds.  Similarly, Freeman (1993) argues that migrants from El Salvador to the U.S. tend to
be educated because the poorly educated have problems finacing  migration costs as well as
problems of language and access to mformation.  Thus, this evidence indicates that unskilled
labor has both a lower income and lower access to credit in order to pay for migration costs.
There is also evidence that migration costs play an important role in the decision to
migrate from Mexico to the U.S.  Morrison and Zabin (1994) found that the Wtade  refoxm in
Mexico initiated in 1985 had a positive impact on migration to the U.S.  They also found that
migraton  from Mexico to the U.S.  increased as the wage in the North of Mexico increased.
Moreover,  in  the  case  of  rumal Pakistan, Adams  (1994) found that  the  share  of
remittances from abroad in total household income rises as income rises, with the share being
1% in the lowest quintle, 3.6% in the second quintile, and 11.6% in the highest quintile.  This
15supports the World Bank fmdings on Morocco. Adams ascribes the difference in the shares to
the high cost of migration, which he estimates at US $1,300 per migrant, and which operates
as a barrier since few low-income people can pay it.
One possible  mechanism  through  which  trade liberalization  may result in higher migration
is through transfers within the family. In a mnmber  of trade liberalizing  countries, the expanding
export industries  have employed  female labor intensively. This can be witnessed in Asia, Latin
America and North Africa in the textile, garments, light electronics and agricultural processing
industries. The higher income earned by the women employees  can then be used to finance the
migration of men.
Faini and Venturini (1993) estimated the relation between outmigration from Southern
Europe to the North and per capita income for Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Spain.  For the
first three countries (the poorest in the sample), they found that migration was positively related
to income  and negatively to income  squared, indicating  that migration  first rises with income
(inequality (1), the migration cost constraint, is the binding one) and then falls with income
(inequality (2b), the income differential constaint,  is the binding one).  In the case of Spain,
migration was found to fall with income, indicating  that at the higher Spanish  per capita income,
the income differential constraint is the binding one.
The argument of the inability  to pay for migration costs is less likely to apply in the case
of contract labor whose transportaion and related costs are paid by the employer.  This practice
is widespread in the  case of migraton  from South Asia and  South-East Asia to  the Gulf.
Complementarity  between trade and migration is less likely in this case.
Clearly, complementarity  between trade liberalization  and migration  is more probable the
16lower is labor income and the higher is the migration costs  The cost of migration depends on
geography, migration laws in both sending and receiving  country, and on transport technology.
For instance, one would expect complementarity  to be more likely for people living in
the South of Mexico and in Central America than in the North of Mexico because wages are
lower and migration costs to the U.S. are higher in the former than in the latter.  Similarly,
complementarity  is more likely to apply for people living in the Sahara region of the Maghreb
(as well as in Mali or Senegal), than for those living in the Northern part of the Maghreb. And
it is more likely for those in the East living further away from Western Europe than those living
closer, both because of higher migration costs and lower income in the former.
Migration laws and regulations  will also affect migration costs.  Costs rise if the sending
country does not allow its citizens to emigrate - such as the Soviet Union or Cuba - or makes
it more difficult for them - such as Haiti recently, cr Morocco after 1975 which made it harder
for Moroccans who wanted to emigrate to obtain a passport.  The receiving country can raise
migration costs by tightening regulations (e.g., by making migration illegal for more people or
by reducing the length of stay for legal immigrants)  as France did for unsdkled immigrants from
Morocco after 1975, and by improving the enforcement of existing regulations.  Thus, one
would expect complementarity  to be more likely to hold for the less skilled labor both because
they earn less and because migration costs are likely to be higher since more of the low-skillcd
or unskilled may be unable to migrate legally.
17V. Condudine  Comments
This paper has shown that trade liberalization in either the sending or the receiving
country is likely to lead to an increase in migration in the long run, though the short-run effect
is ambiguous. It has also shown that foreign aid, if it benefits labor, as well as remittances, are
likely to  result in  an increase in migration both in  the short and in the  long run.  These
complemetarity  effects between trade liberalization, foreign aid and remittances, on the one
hand, and migration on the other, are more likely to be important  the lower labor income and
the higher the migration costs. Hence, this should be particularly applicable  to South-North  and
East-West migration as incomes in the sending countries are often low compared to mi-gration
costs.
Wlhat  about interaction effects?  If trade liberalization is significant enough to have a
positive effect on migration, then adding foreign aid is likely to dampen the effect of trade
liberalization  while  remittnances  will  have  no  additional effect  on  migration.  If  trade
liberalization  was too timid  to have a positive effect on migration, then adding either foreign aid
or remittances is likely to have a positive effect on migration.
The welfare gains of trade liberalization in the case of a positive migration effect are
larger than the traditional gains from freeing trade and also include the international wage
differential net of migration costs for the additional  migrants.  One aspect which was abstracted
from in the cost of migration and in the welfare calculus is the loss of social capital associated
with migration. The migrant loses  from leaving home, cultre,  lifestyle, language, family and
friends, while residents in the South lose because a member of the family and a friend has
emigrated.  Futre  work will include a more detailed analysis of the welfare consequences  of
18migration, including the effect of loss of social capital, for the sending country as well as for
the receiving country and for the migrants.  °
20 On the welfare consequences  of migration in the presence of social capital,  see Schiff
1992.
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